Building (or Losing) Trust in our Software Supply Chain

Back in 2014, when I was managing Tofino Security, I became very interested in the Dragonfly attacks against industrial control systems (ICS). I was particularly fascinated with the ways that the attackers exploited the trust between ICS suppliers and their customers. Frankly, this scared me because, as I will explain, I knew that all the firewalls, antivirus, whitelisting, and patching in the world would do little to protect us from this threat.

If you are not familiar with the Dragonfly attacks, they were launched against the pharmaceutical industry (and likely the energy industry) in 2013 and 2014. The attacks actually started in early 2013 with a spear phishing campaign against company executives. But the part that concerned me began later, starting in June 2013 and ending in April 2014.

 

During that period, the Dragonfly attackers penetrated the websites of three ICS vendors: vendors who supply hardware and software to the industrial market. Once the bad guys controlled these websites, they replaced the vendors’ legitimate software/firmware packages with new packages that had Trojan malware called Havex embedded in them (Attack Stage #1).

When the vendors’ customers went to these websites they would see that there was a new version of software for their ICS products. They would then download these infected packages, believing them to be valid updates (Attack Stage #2). And because one of the messages we give in the security world is to “keep your systems patched,” these users pushed out the evil updates to the control systems in their plants (Attack Stage #3).

Once these systems were infected, the Havex malware would call back to the hacker’s command and control center, informing the attackers that they had penetrated deep into a control system. The attackers then downloaded tools for ICS reconnaissance and manipulation into the infected ICS hardware (Attack Stage #4). These new attack tools focused on the protocols we all know well in the ICS world, such as Modbus, OPC, and Ethernet/IP.

As far as we know, the attackers were most interested in stealing industrial intellectual property — not destroying equipment or endangering lives. However, there was nothing that would have restricted the attackers to just information theft. Their tool sets were extremely flexible and could have easily included software that would manipulate or destroy a process.

The Dragonfly attacks were particularly insidious because they took advantage of the trust between suppliers and end users. The engineers and technicians in industrial plants inherently trust their suppliers to provide safe, secure, and reliable software. By downloading software and installing it, the Dragonfly victims were doing what they had been told would improve their plant’s security. In effect, these users were unwittingly helping the attackers bypass all the firewalls, circumvent any whitelisting or malware detection, and go directly to the critical control systems.

This is what I call “Exploiting the Supplier-User Trust Chain” — and I think it is one of the most serious security risks facing our world today. It is not only a problem for ICS-focused industries like energy or manufacturing, but also for any person or company that uses “smart “ devices… which is pretty well all of us. Aircraft, automobiles, and medical devices are all susceptible to this sort of attack.

So with the help of Billy Rios, Dr. Jonathan Butts , a great team of researchers, and the DHS Silicon Valley Initiatives Program, I’ve been working on finding a solution to the Chain-of-Trust challenge. aDolus and Security Trust Anchor (STA) are the result of 1000s of hours of our systematic investigation into the problem and its possible solutions. Join me on this blog over the next few months as I share what we have learned and where we still have to go to ensure trust in our software.

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